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INTRODUCTION 
Privacy legislation in Australia is experiencing interesting times.  The 
Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) has published its 
Discussion Paper on its Review of Australian Privacy Law dealing with 
the potential amendment of the Commonwealth Privacy Act.2  The 
ALRC review is the third review of the Act in the past three years, with 
additional reviews being performed by the Australian Office of the 
Privacy Commissioner (OPC).3  In short, this is an area where 
considerable developments are being proposed and considered. 
The Discussion Paper recommends significant changes both to the 
structure of Australian privacy legislation4 and to the substantive 
obligations.  Recommended changes to substantive obligations will 
impact research by imposing obligations regarding the privacy of 
deceased persons5 and third parties whose information was not 
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and 12 July 2007, Gold Coast, by the Queensland University of Technology Faculty of Law.  
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federal privacy legislation override state and territory privacy legislation in relation to health 
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5 Ibid, Chapter 3. 
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solicited,6 and by imposing an obligation to ensure that the personal 
information they collect is relevant to the purpose for which it is 
collected.7 
These developments should be taken seriously.  Some researchers 
consider that the Privacy Act presents a significant obstacle in the 
conduct of research.8  There is no doubt that, compared to 
untrammelled rights of access, the Privacy Act has resulted in higher 
research costs, lost opportunities, less effective research and sub-optimal 
quality of data.  However, privacy legislation has the potential to be even 
more burdensome than it is, or even to prevent research from occurring.  
It is in researchers’ bests interests to understand how that might occur.  
These developments are important not just because they might have a 
chilling effect on research, but because they show that community 
acceptance of research – and researcher’s need to use personal 
information to obtain significant results - cannot be taken for granted.  
The purpose of this chapter is to consider the political and legal 
landscape that surrounds privacy legislation and to argue that without a 
commitment by researchers to engage with the Australian society, 
privacy legislation will remain subject to change in this way. 
The chapter will commence by conducting a brief tour of the politics of 
rights.  Privacy legislation was enacted to meet a perceived need, and 
that perception is more important than the reality.  The chapter will then 
examine how research takes place in accordance with privacy legislation.  
It is argued that, although research may occur without obtaining the 
consent of subjects, the exceptions are both less available than they are 
perceived to be, and do not advance the cause of research generally.  
Ultimately, however, the framework of privacy law itself provides 
researchers with significant opportunities to influence the regulatory 
environment within which they must operate.  This can be done in a 
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simple way: by adopting the rule-of-thumb that wherever consent can be 
obtained, it should be obtained. 
UNDERSTANDING THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS 
The Privacy Act, and privacy legislation generally, protect information 
(whether true or not) from which a person’s identity can reasonably be 
ascertained.  This type of information is known as ‘personal  info-
rmation’. 
The Commonwealth Privacy Act was enacted following the demise of the 
‘Australia Card’ proposal in 1988.  That proposal failed due to significant 
public opposition to the idea of government collecting and controlling 
data relating to the activities of Australian citizens.  The Act was created 
to meet a perceived need that privacy was a valid right, one that was 
endangered (whether actually or potentially) and one that needed to be 
protected.   
Privacy legislation therefore exists within the politics of rights.  By this 
phrase, I mean the discourse within society about what interests are 
worth protecting and how strong that protection should be.  Inevitably, 
the politics of rights involves questions of balance.  For example, the 
right to free speech must be balanced against the right not to be vilified 
because of one’s gender, sexual orientation, race or religion.  The politics 
of any given right is a contest between differing views about when a 
generally acceptable balance is reached.  Most importantly, the 
acceptability of any given balance can change.  For example, Australian 
society generally acknowledges the right of individuals to seek 
compensation for personal injury, if that injury is caused by another 
person.  Nevertheless, that right was severely curtailed during the recent 
tort ‘reforms’, because of the perception that compensation was being 
awarded too easily, in amounts that were excessive and in respect of 
losses that were properly the plaintiff’s personal responsibility.9 
The best example of how the politics of rights may be used is the actions 
of the tobacco industry.  Fifty years after evidence began to accumulate 
that showed the link between cigarette smoking and cancer, the tobacco 
industry is still able to function effectively in the manufacture and sale of 
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their products.10  Despite killing almost 20 000 Australians per year,11 
the tobacco industry’s actions go on almost completely unregulated.12  
This has occurred because the tobacco industry has been very effective 
in controlling the terms of the debate.  Instead of concentrating on the 
public health, the tobacco industry has focussed on ‘the individual’s right 
to choose’.  Instead of allowing the debate to be about the cost of 
healthcare, the tobacco industry has focussed on the perils of taxation 
and government bureaucracy.13  Lastly, whenever regulation of the 
industry is proposed, the industry has suggested that this is simply a 
precursor to prohibition, which it blandly states ‘doesn’t work’. 
What are the lessons for privacy in the politics of rights?  First, simple 
messages with emotional appeal are very powerful.  Prohibition and 
freedom are simple messages; so is ‘Big Brother’.  Second, perception is 
more important than reality.  If people believe that something is wrong, 
they will support measures to change it, even if nothing is ‘really’ wrong.  
Third, and most important, just because you are ‘right’ doesn’t mean you 
will succeed in achieving your goals. 
It is therefore important to remember that all it takes is for a ‘privacy 
scare’ to occur, and politicians may see that it is in their best interests 
electorally to alter the privacy legislation to better protect the right of 
privacy.  Politicians tend to infer society’s views on an issue from how 
that issue plays in the media.14  If the media can frame a message in the 
right way, and this generates traction within the community, politicians 
will be tempted to introduce legislation to meet the perceived demand.15 
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Ultimately, researchers should acknowledge that all their actions fashion 
the regulatory environment in which they operate, not just those that are 
explicitly political. 
WHAT DOES THE PUBLIC ACTUALLY THINK? 
Many researchers appear to take the stance that the OPC is part of a 
‘privacy lobby’,16 which stands in the way of progressive and necessary 
research; research the Australian society understands and with which it 
generally agrees.  The attitude of the ‘privacy lobby’ is said not to be 
representative of the Australian public.  The reality is that the stance 
taken by the OPC simply reflects their understanding of the attitudes of 
Australian society.17  The relationship of those attitudes to privacy and 
research is somewhat ambivalent.  Surveys commissioned by the OPC, 
the Commonwealth Department of Health and Ageing (DoHA) and by 
the National Health and Medical Research Council (NHRMC) report 
that anywhere between one third and two thirds of Australians are 
against the use of identifying information for research without the 
consent of the subject.18  One fifth of individuals in one survey reported 
reluctance to provide their medical history or health information to any 
organisation.19   
These attitudes exist even where research is accepted as important.  In 
one survey, although 83% of respondents believed such research was 
critically or very important, 73% of respondents believed it was critically 
or very important to get consent for each research study.20  Given such 
attitudes, the representations made by the OPC are at least as 
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representative of the Australian community as those made by the 
researchers.  
The best way to counter the representations is to address the 
community’s concerns.  
CONDUCTING RESEARCH THAT COMPLIES WITH 
PRIVACY LEGISLATION 
The Privacy Act allows the collection, use and disclosure of health 
information that identifies an individual in five relevant circumstances: 
1. with the individual’s consent;21 
2. for a secondary purpose that is: 
2.1. directly related to the primary purpose; and 
2.2. within the individual's reasonable expectations,22 
3. for research relevant to public health or public safety;  
4. for the compilation or analysis of statistics relevant to public health 
or public safety; or  
5. for the management, funding or monitoring of a health service.23 
Obtaining the subject’s consent can be inconvenient, difficult or 
impossible, depending on the size, timing, subject matter, importance 
and methodology of the research proposal.  The population which 
forms the subject of the study may be dead, transient, remote or simply 
uncooperative.  In many cases, researchers may consider that if consent 
is required, it is simply not worthwhile to perform the study.  In such 
circumstances, many researchers will be tempted to try to bring their 
research within the exceptions to consent.  However, there are a number 
of traps that mean that care should be taken. 
Secondary Purposes 
The secondary purpose must be within the reasonable expectations of 
the individual who forms the subject of the research, not the 
expectations of the Human Research Ethics Committees (HREC) or the 
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researcher.  Researchers and HREC members form a relatively small 
subset of the population; one which is aware of the various uses to 
which health information could be put.  As a rule of thumb, the rest of 
society can only ‘reasonably’ be considered to know what they have seen 
on television.  For example, researchers and HRECs are aware that 
clinical review of a particular individual may take place within a health 
service, at conferences, or in the course of multi-site research into the 
effectiveness of a particular medical technology.  By comparison, the rest 
of society probably only understands clinical review of a particular 
individual to take place within the health service, and probably only if an 
adverse event has occurred.24 
HRECs, the Public Interest and Impracticability  
The last three possible circumstances may only take place where other 
circumstances exist.  These circumstances are where: 
à the purpose cannot be served by the collection or use of 
de-identified information; and 
à it is impracticable for the organisation to seek the 
individual’s consent to the collection; and 
à the information is collected: 
 as required by law (other than the Privacy Act 
itself);  or  
 in accordance with rules established by 
competent health or medical bodies that deal 
with obligations of professional confidentiality 
which bind the organisation; or 
 in accordance with guidelines approved by the 
OPC. 
The Guidelines published by the OPC provide that where collection, use 
or disclosure takes place for the purpose of research, that research must 
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about research, e-Research and health research, there is an obvious need for further research.  
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be approved by a HREC.  HRECs may approve such research only if 
they consider that the public interest in the research substantially 
outweighs the public interest in maintaining the level of privacy 
protection provided by the privacy legislation.  This occurs by taking 
into account: 
à the value and public importance of the research;  
à the likely benefits to the participants;  
à whether the research design can be modified;  
à the financial costs of not proceeding with the research;  
à the type of personal information being sought;  
à the risk of harm to individuals; and  
à the extent of a possible breach of privacy.25 
While the potential benefits of the research are often apparent, the 
potential detriment is not always clear.  The detriment is, simply, that 
people will not trust their doctors.  Without an assurance that their 
health information will remain private, people may not seek the health 
care they need, or may not provide a full medical history.  This may in 
turn increase the risks to their own health and the health of others.26  
For example, the Cancer Council has recently stated that some cancer 
patients are too scared and embarrassed to seek help for their condition 
because of the stigma of smoking.27  Again, HRECs should remember 
that they are part of a small portion of society that has both regular 
contact with doctors and a good understanding of the research that is 
conducted to supplement medicine. 
Lastly, many researchers and doctors consider that the question of 
impracticability is one to be decided by the HREC.  This is incorrect.  
Impracticability is a question of law.  In the opinion of the OPC and the 
National Health and Medical Research Council (NHRMC), 
impracticability occurs where: 
                                                        
25 National Health and Medical Research Council, Guidelines under Section 95 of the Privacy Act 
1988 (2000) Guideline 3.2. 
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à the subjects are uncontactable due to death or relocation or part 
of a demographic group that is typically difficult to contact,  
à the sheer number of records involved may cause logistical 
problems,  
à the procedures required to obtain consent are likely either to 
cause unnecessary anxiety for those whose consent would be 
sought; or 
à the objective of the investigation may need to be concealed 
from subjects in order to minimise various forms of bias.28 
Note that this is a high barrier to overcome.  Researchers and HRECs 
should be careful of being seen as too willing to allow research to occur 
without obtaining consent from the subjects of the research. 
A strict reading of privacy legislation, therefore, imposes significant 
obstacles in the path of researchers seeking to use personal information.  
This is the intention behind the legislation: to make consent the ‘default’ 
option which researchers should consider first before seeking to utilise 
the exceptions set out above. 
CONSENT AND ITS BENEFICIARIES 
The short term goals of any researcher are the successful completion 
and publication of research.  For health researchers, a long term goal is 
to promote health research as an essential part of ensuring that people 
get the best care possible.  In such circumstances, obtaining consent 
directly from subjects (and not relying on the exemptions discussed 
above) has two significant benefits.   
First, obtaining consent is the surest way to avoid litigation challenging 
research that takes place under an exception to the consent requirement.  
Such litigation will take place in the courts, and judges are more likely to 
be sympathetic to the discourse of rights than they will be to postulated 
future benefits of research.  Court decisions are often published in the 
media, and may result in the imposition of financial penalties.  Court 
decisions also serve to mobilise political forces, by making people think 
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about social interactions in new ways.29  Adverse judicial decisions 
therefore pose the most significant risk of a chilling effect on the 
conduct of research.   
Second, the process of obtaining consent from a subject necessarily 
involves education.  To provide informed consent, the subject must be 
made aware of the research that is occurring and the need for that 
subject’s participation in the research.  This normalises research, and 
participation in research.  Every person who is involved in research and 
who does not experience an intrusion into their privacy will be less taken 
in by the simple messages, like ‘Big Brother’, that may be used to 
undermine research.  The longer the process of normalisation goes on, 
the less public concern will be reflected by the OPC and the rest of the 
‘privacy lobby’.  In other words, one of the primary beneficiaries of the 
consent process will be the research community generally.  The 
assumption that privacy legislation is something to be tolerated is false, 
and is a dangerous assumption to make. 
CONCLUSION 
The ultimate message of this chapter is that regulatory regimes are not 
set in stone; the ALRC Discussion Paper is perfect evidence of the 
dynamic of review, discussion and amendment.  Even with its 
frustrations, the current privacy regime cannot be taken for granted.  
Legislative change is as capable of making research harder as it is of 
making research easier.   
Given this reality, researchers should consider how their actions will 
affect the long term viability of their discipline.  Researchers should 
adopt the approach that, wherever consent can be obtained, it must be 
obtained.  This approach is demanded by the law, but it also provides 
researchers with an opportunity to educate the public about the 
importance of health research.  Simply by undertaking the process of 
education, researchers generate trust, because they show society that 
society’s views are taken seriously.30  In the long term, this is the best 
way to ensure that research remains viable and legitimate. 
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Researchers living a one-grant-to-the-next reality may find these 
comments utopian.  I acknowledge that taking a conservative approach 
to consent might reduce the possibility of significant research being 
undertaken.  However, I am only advocating a general approach, and 
exemptions – though rare – may be justifiable.  The only word of 
caution I have is this: what will the effect on research be if authorities 
start making grants contingent upon obtaining consent from all subjects? 
 
